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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 New York Life Insurance Company (“New York Life”) filed an interpleader 
complaint to request that the District Court determine the rightful beneficiary of two 
annuities it had issued to Marvin Samuels, M.D., who died in 2014.  New York Life 
named three putative beneficiaries:  Samuels’ niece, Rebecca Legault; his former 
domestic partner, Francesco Papaleo; and his friend, Sharon Paige, a.k.a. Alfred Ricco.  
After Paige filed an answer to the complaint, Legault filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  The District Court granted the motion insofar as Paige was dismissed from the 
case and barred from asserting any claim to the annuities or any claim against Legault 
relating to the annuities.  Paige twice sought reconsideration of the decision without 
success.  Subsequently, Legault and Papaleo reached a settlement, and the District Court 
ordered the distribution of funds to them.1  Paige appeals.2 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s ruling on the motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2002).  We review an order 
denying reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel Lou-
Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).   
                                              
1 On Paige’s motion, the distribution of the funds has been stayed until the resolution of 
this matter on appeal.   
 
2 Paige twice filed a notice of appeal, once after the orders denying reconsideration of the 
initial decision dismissing her from the action (opening C.A. No. 16-1369), and once 
after the final order directing the payment of funds to Legault and Papaleo (opening C.A. 
No. 16-3259).  Initially, we dismissed C.A. No. 16-1369 for an apparent want of 
jurisdiction, but we later vacated that order and consolidated the two appeals.   
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 The District Court properly granted Legault’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings against Paige.  As the District Court stated, there was no dispute that Legault 
was the last named beneficiary of both annuities.  And, as the District Court explained, 
there was no dispute about whether Samuels made every reasonable effort to change the 
beneficiary from Legault to Paige.  See Alkhafaji v. TIAA-CREF Individual & 
Institutional Servs., LLC, 69 A.3d 219, 222 (Pa. 2013) (explaining that, under 
Pennsylvania law, a beneficiary change can be made either by strictly complying with 
policy terms or by making “every reasonable effort to comply with the notice 
requirements of the policy”).   
 Furthermore, on appeal, Paige does not argue that Samuels named her as a 
beneficiary; instead, she disavows any argument that she or Samuels caused or sought to 
remove Legault as the beneficiary.  See, e.g., Reply Brief at 8.  Her arguments for relief 
center on how New York Life should have treated information about Samuels’ granting 
her power-of-attorney and on how New York Life should have given her access to the 
funds on the day before Samuels’ death for Samuels’ medical care and personal and legal 
needs.  Those arguments do not undermine the District Court’s conclusion.  Likewise, 
Paige’s claim that the judgment against her deprived her of pursuing a compulsory 
counterclaim against New York Life is not a reason to vacate the judgment.  Paige did 
not include any counterclaim in her answer to New York Life’s interpleader complaint.    
 The District Court also properly denied reconsideration.  Reconsideration is 
warranted under limited circumstances, such as when a litigant shows “(1) an intervening 
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change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available 
when the court [ruled]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent 
manifest injustice.”  Max’s Seafood Cafe by Lou-Ann, Inc., 176 F.3d at 677 (citation 
omitted).  As the District Court explained, the evidence that Paige presented in her first 
motion for reconsideration could not be properly considered as new, but even if it were so 
considered, it did not support reconsideration.  See Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dougherty, 986 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Garland v. Craven, 41 A.2d 
140 (Pa. 1945), for the proposition that a “mere declaration of intent” is insufficient to 
effect a beneficiary change).  As the District Court noted in regards to the second motion 
for reconsideration, Paige was essentially attempting to get the proverbial “second bite of 
the apple.”  Also, we note that in that motion for reconsideration, as in this appeal, Paige 
stated that she did not assert to be a beneficiary.    
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.    
